After or against secularism: Muslims in Europe by Narkowicz, Kasia & Phillips, Richard
This is a peer-reviewed, post-print (final draft post-refereeing) version of the following published document, 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in The Routledge handbook of 
postsecularity on the 13th of November 2018, available online: https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-
Handbook-of-Postsecularity/Beaumont/p/book/9781138234147 and is licensed under All Rights Reserved 
license:
Narkowicz, Kasia ORCID: 0000-0003-3733-922X and Phillips, Richard 
ORCID: 0000-0003-4630-4555 (2018) After or against secularism: Muslims 
in Europe. In: The Routledge handbook of postsecularity. Routledge, 
Abingdon, pp. 349-360. ISBN 9781315307824 
Official URL: https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-
Postsecularity/Beaumont/p/book/9781138234147
EPrint URI: http://eprints.glos.ac.uk/id/eprint/6217
Disclaimer 
The University of Gloucestershire has obtained warranties from all depositors as to their title in the material 
deposited and as to their right to deposit such material.  
The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation or warranties of commercial utility, title, or fitness 
for a particular purpose or any other warranty, express or implied in respect of any material deposited.  
The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation that the use of the materials will not infringe any 
patent, copyright, trademark or other property or proprietary rights.  
The University of Gloucestershire accepts no liability for any infringement of intellectual property rights in any 
material deposited but will remove such material from public view pending investigation in the event of an 
allegation of any such infringement. 
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR TEXT.
29 After or against secularism: Muslims in Europe 
Kasia Narkowicz and Richard Phillips 
Introduction 
The postsecular has been conceptualized, both in general terms and also in relation to particular 
countries and religious groups, as a historical shift in which religion is returning from the 
margins and the shadows to the centre ground of public life (Habermas 2008). From the 
perspective of religious groups, minorities in particular, narratives of the return of religion are 
problematic. We develop this argument with reference to British Muslims of Pakistani heritage, 
and Polish Muslims with mixed heritage. 
Though the UK and Poland differ religiously, politically and social-economically, both countries 
have experienced a decline in individual adherence to the majority Christian faith. Consequently, 
both fit within Jürgen Habermas’s conception of the postsecular as the historical successor of 
secularism: 
A “post-secular” society must at some point have been in a “secular” state. The controversial 
term can therefore only be applied to the affluent societies of Europe or countries such as 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, where people’s religious ties have steadily or rather quite 
dramatically lapsed in the post-War period. 
(Habermas 2008: 1) 
For Habermas, the postsecular emerges from and signals a change in consciousness whereby the 
‘hushed up voice of religion’ is invited back into the public sphere (Cloke and Beaumont 2013: 
44). The precondition for this postsecularity is conformity, on the part of the religious, to the 
norms of ‘secular discourse’ (Habermas 2008:1). From this perspective, religion is regarded as a 
moral supplement to secular politics (Asad 2003). The postsecular follows—but fits into the 
space vacated by—secularism, just as secularism is said to have occupied the space once vacated 
by religion. 
One reason why this understanding of the postsecular is problematic is its exclusivity. Cloke and 
Beaumont (2013) welcome the inclusion of progressive elements of religion into the public 
sphere. This claim, though important in itself, raises questions about how we might regard the 
contributions of religious individuals and groups who identify or do not identify as progressive, 
and who may identify or be identified as conservative. Distinctions between progressive and 
regressive religiosity risk ignoring the contributions of conservative religious groups (Fabian and 
Korolczuk 2017) and fail to capture the messy and complex ways in which religion influences 
the everyday (Mahmood 2005). 
We challenge the ‘historical shift’ vision of postsecularism, not by advancing another grand 
history, but rather through a series of smaller stories, which highlight ways in which religious 
minorities have experienced the postsecular. This approach brings a postcolonial sensibility—
one that means listening to subaltern groups rather than making assumptions about them or 
entertaining dominant representations of them (Spivak 1988)—to understandings of 
postsecularism. For our purposes, we ‘listen’ to Polish and British Pakistani Muslims in two 
ways: firstly by drawing upon published research by others, which offers insights into the ways 
in which religious experience and identification have been configured at different points in time, 
with particular reference to the past few decades; secondly, through empirical research of our 
own. The case study of Muslims in Poland draws upon interviews, conducted by Kasia 
Narkowicz in 2011–2012, which examined contemporary conflicts around religion and 
secularism in that country.1 The second case study touches upon interviews with British Muslims 
of Pakistani heritage, which was conducted as part of a larger project led by Richard Phillips, on 
relationship practices and choices in a diverse society. All the participants’ names have been 
anonymized. 
Listening to Polish and British Pakistani Muslims, we find that their religion never went away, 
not, at least, within the historical frame of these case studies, which include periods in which 
religion was seen to have been banished to the private sphere (in Communist Poland) or 
overshadowed by national and ethnic identities (in the case of first-generation British Pakistanis). 
Polish Muslims and Catholics did not simply wait for a non-secular present; they positioned 
themselves against secularism. Even when it was apparently subsumed within the private sphere 
by mainstream secularism and official atheism, and when it seemed to play second fiddle to other 
forms of identification including ethnicity and race, Islam has been present in the day-to-day 
lives of Polish and British Pakistani Muslims and has not only been limited to the private sphere. 
Though these groups have not always been seen as religious minorities, from the perspective of 
the mainstream, and though they have not always primarily emphasized the religious in their 
self-identification, it would be wrong to suggest that their religion was forgotten or unimportant, 
whether privately or publicly (a problematic dualism for many). Rather than rediscovering 
religion, these groups have always been religious—have always been Muslims—and have 
articulated this differently, through intersectional identities in which religion, culture, ethnicity, 
and race are all important, but are advanced differently and strategically in different contexts. 
These two case studies therefore contest conceptions of postsecularism as after secularism, 
presenting it instead as against secularism. These conceptions are encapsulated in some 
prominent representations of British Muslims of Pakistani heritage and Polish Muslims of mixed 
heritage, representations that do not always accord with the ways in which members of these 
communities represent themselves, doing so for strategic reasons, rather than simply to describe 
themselves. 
Practising Muslims in Poland 
The chronological understanding of postsecularism—as after secularism—appears to closely 
match the experience of countries that were until recently officially secular. Secularism has been 
abandoned or defeated in different places for different reasons, but a large swathe of European 
countries has similar experiences, brought about by the demise of Communism and the fall of the 
Soviet Union. Postsecularism has been most pronounced where, as in Poland, a pronounced 
religious culture preceded Communism and was repressed, but not eradicated, by the atheism of 
that period. In such settings, religion was waiting in the wings, occasionally surfacing in public 
life, and it has resumed its central place in society. Without wishing to deny that there are fewer 
obstacles to the public expression of religion today than there were before 1989, we will contest 
the assumption that religion was effectively banished to the private sphere under the Communist 
system. 
Poland was not only non-secular then: it was actively postsecular in the twofold sense that some 
religious people were contesting the official suppression of religion by the ruling Communist 
Party and others were practising their faith in ways and spaces that transcended the private 
sphere. First, the Catholic Church played a crucial role in the mobilisation of the Solidarity pro-
democracy movement. Danuta Walęsa, the wife of opposition leader, and later President Lech 
Wałęsa, remembered Sunday mass as a chance to meet, organize, and strategize with fellow 
opposition movement colleagues in a safe space (Wałęsa 2011). The interventions of religion in 
the public sphere during key historical moments was similarly evident in the USA where black 
churches provided spaces for the mobilisation of the civil rights movement (Calhoun et al 2011). 
The Polish Church was also active in formal process. It initiated dialogue with the Communist 
leadership when the regime realized it could no longer ignore dissent (Romanowski 2012). The 
role of the church has grown and changed since 1989; it is now an important ally of the populist 
right-wing government, with which it is pursuing the long-held project of Catholic nation-
building (Jaskulowski et al 2018), and since 1989, intervening on issues such as abortion 
(Fuszara 1993, Guerra 2016) and migration (Narkowicz 2018). And yet, though Poland is now 
overtly non-secular, the part played by the Church in the pro-democracy movement prior to the 
fall of Communism reminds us that the nation was not entirely secular, even during that time. 
Even then, the admittance or imposition of religious voices in the political public sphere, where 
they articulated ideas of justice, rights, and morality as part of rational deliberation, was 
consistent with the postsecular, as Habermas (2008) defines the term. 
Second, also under Communism, religious minorities were practising their faith in ways and 
spaces that transcended the private sphere. Muslims, who had been part of the religious Polish 
landscape since the tenth century when Tatars established a presence in what was then the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania (Antonowicz-Bauer 1984: 346; Pedziwiatr 2011), grew in number in the 
1970s and 1980s. Despite the ‘closed borders’ and isolation from much of the world during the 
Communist years, a significant Muslim migration took place during Communism. Arab students 
from ‘befriended’ countries such as Palestine, Kuwait, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq arrived to 
study at Polish universities (Narkowicz and Pędziwiatr 2017). 
Muslims in Communist Poland might be assumed to have confined their religious expression to 
the private sphere. But this narrative is challenged by stories that are told by Muslims in Poland 
about their religious identification and expression at this time which signal a growth and 
diversification in the Muslim community. Despite a homogenous conception of the Polish 
nation-state that was exclusive of minorities already during Communism (Zaremba 2001), 
Muslims were able to actively practice their faith. Upon arrival, during the 1970s, the Muslim 
students quickly started organizing places of worship and established a vibrant religious 
community, separate from the Tatar Muslim community. Muslim prayer halls were established in 
various locations; at universities, in people’s homes, and in rented accommodation (Narkowicz 
and Pędziwiatr 2017). An imam of a Warsaw mosque, interviewed by Kasia in 2011, recalls how 
he and his fellow Muslim students used the university space to organize and meet their religious 
needs: 
The brothers arranged to have a room on the top floor of the student halls. It was not a room 
for other students but like an attic, and the director of the student hall agreed for that room to 
be a prayer space… And it was similar in other cities like Lublin, in Poznań, in Katowice, in 
Wrocław... it started with someone offering up their room for Friday prayers or the directors 
of those student halls designated a room in the building for the Muslim students to pray in. 
… And already then Muslims started thinking that they wanted to have mosques and the 
activity started going in this direction. 
As the imam recalled, despite an ostensibly anti-religious landscape in Poland during 
Communism, the arrival of the Arab students during that time contributed to a further 
diversification of non-secular spaces within secular institutions such as the university. With time, 
many smaller prayer halls were established, and some key Muslim centres were formed in the 
cities of Warsaw, Łódź, Wrocław, Katowice, Kraków, Poznań, Lublin, and Białystok. 
In an interview reported in the Polish media, a Muslim convert argued that ‘it is not possible for 
a Muslim to lead a completely secular life’ (Gasior 2014:1). Some Muslim women, interviewed 
by Kasia, made a similar point, refusing secularist pressure to leave their religions at the door 
step before entering the public sphere. Oliwia put it this way: 
What frightens non-Muslims, or what they can’t understand, is that religion in a Western sense 
is something private, like you go to your temple, you have something at home, you will pray 
when you feel like it, and so on. Islam is not like that, of course it depends on how every 
person understands it, but really… many people accuse Islam of not being a religion but an 
ideology and true, it is. I always say ‘yes you are right’! 
She explained further that being a Muslim ‘relates to all things in society, what to do, what to 
eat, what to wear and so on’. From this perspective, secularism is not only not desirable, it is 
impossible. This impossibility challenges the idea of a rational, religiously neutral public sphere 
(Calhoun et al. 2011) and of a Habermasian postsecular space of translation, in which religion is 
welcome but on a limited, conditional basis, particularly one that favours unthreatening forms of 
Islam and those that are seen by others as ‘progressive’ and/or ‘moderate’. Here, as elsewhere in 
Europe, it is argued that in order to be accepted into public space, Muslims are required to 
‘translate’ themselves, diluting their religious presence (Asad 2003: 159, 169). 
Expression of both Catholicism and Islam in Polish public life runs from the officially secular 
Communist era to the overtly non-secular present. These and other religions have in some cases 
been mutually supportive. Some Polish Muslims say that they find it easier to be overtly 
religious in a society in which religion is accepted and commonplace. Oliwia commented that 
‘Poland is a religious country’ and as such ‘it is still easier for us to keep our faith and culture 
here; as Muslims’. A similar point was made in an interview with a man called Marek, also 
interviewed in 2011, who told Kasia that ‘[Catholics] understand that religious convictions might 
entail practices that might seem weird to some people. I don’t know, Catholics in Poland still 
have got an understanding for fasting, right?’ In these interviews, Polish Muslims felt that they 
did not need to translate themselves in order to be understood. 
The continued presence of religion in Polish public life, not only after the fall of Communism 
but also before, questions simple historical claims that might be made about the secular past and 
the postsecular present. Catholics and Muslims, in their different ways, have not simply waited 
for a non-secular present, but they have consistently positioned themselves against secularism. 
The next section, focussing upon another European Muslim minority, interrogates the ostensibly 
postsecular present from another angle. It contests simplistic but commonplace narratives about 
the rise of religiosity and the concomitant eclipse of ethnic and national identification among 
Muslims in Britain. 
Intersectional identities: Pakistani and Muslim 
Histories of British Pakistani Muslims in the UK typically portray a historical shift from 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi to Muslim identities. This narrative, describing a recent religious turn, 
is in keeping with wider histories of race and difference which trace a shift from nationality to 
race to religion, as primary means through which minorities are identified both in mainstream 
discourse such as government policies on multiculturalism, and also in claims about the ways in 
which minorities self-identify. Yet, this periodization is complicated, if not contradicted, by 
evidence of how members of this group identify and position themselves. 
In his Foreword to Tariq Modood’s Multicultural Politics, Craig Calhoun observes that Britons 
with Pakistani heritage, many of whom migrated in the postwar period or descend from migrant 
communities established then, were ‘initially mostly termed “Pakistanis” (or more abusively, 
“Pakis”)’, but have been ‘recategorized first as Asians and then as Muslims’ (Calhoun in 
Modood, 2005: x). Simultaneously, many of those who were previously categorized as 
Pakistanis have come to distance themselves from Pakistan and disavow Pakistani identities, 
both of which have assumed ‘a burdensome set of undertones in the imaginary of both British 
Pakistanis and Britons’ alike’, according to Marta Bolognani (2014: 114). The move away from 
this (and other) national or ethnic identities and categories has taken place alongside another 
shift, in this case away from a singular, inclusive, strategically essentialist ‘black’ identity 
politics (Alexander 2000: 231). In the place of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and some other national 
and ethnic identities, and in place or instead of ‘black’ or other racial identities, many people 
have either positioned themselves or been positioned as Muslims (Modood 1992); or so it is said. 
This thumbnail sketch of communities and identities is simplistic, and it is at the very least 
complicated and sometimes contradicted outright by the ways in which members of minority 
groups speak and say they think about themselves. The shifts in how this minority are variously 
categorized by others and in how they tend to see or position themselves, which are not always 
the same thing and frequently diverge, should not be misunderstood as simply a shift in how 
people identify: moving away from culture and/or race and then to religion. First, the emergent 
Islamic identification does not banish the racial and political dimensions of the terms it has 
displaced. Rather, contemporary Islam encompasses and supersedes constructions of race. 
‘Modood shows clearly that race—and racism—remained inextricably intertwined in the way 
British Muslims were’ and arguably still are ‘understood’ (Calhoun in Modood 2005: x). Since 
Islam has come to encompass political and racial dimensions, and is always about more than 
religion, the increasing propensity of individuals to identify or be identified with Islam should 
not be seen as a narrowly religious turn, nor as the exchange of one identity for another. It can be 
understood as a ‘positioning’ rather than ‘essence’ (Hall 1990: 226; quoted by Alexander 2000: 
231). 
It would be wrong to see the identities left behind by the shift towards Islam as irreligious or 
secular in the sense that religion would have been confined to the private sphere. Among those 
who identified primarily as Pakistani and those who still do, nationality was and still is widely 
assumed to define religion. According to Haleh Afshar, those who identify or identified as 
Pakistani ‘automatically assumed that this implied that they were Muslims’ (Afshar et al. 2006: 
172; see also Modood et al 1997; Samad 1998). This assumption is reasonable given that most 
Pakistanis in the UK are indeed Muslims. Among the 625,000 or so Britons with Pakistani 
heritage who were living in England at the time of the 2001 Census, 92% were Muslims (Change 
Institute 2009: 30). 
The shift from primarily Pakistani to Islamic identification has not really been a religious turn 
because those describing themselves in these shifting terms have not switched from national to 
religious identities, but from national identities in which religious identification was implicit, to 
religious identities in which nationality and/or race are implicit, important, and politicized. This 
shift is multifaceted, as are its drivers. Important, among these, are the possibilities that 
minorities find in focussing upon the things they hold in common (including faith) rather than 
those that have kept them apart (such as national lines between Pakistanis and Bangladeshis). 
These commonalities bring the promise of solidarity in relation to external pressures. Meanwhile, 
identification with religion rather than culture can be empowering to particular members of these 
communities in their relationships with each other. Young British men and women with 
Pakistani heritage are among those who have found agency in speaking as Muslims. Doing so, 
they are able to make and justify life choices, some of which go against cultural traditions and 
family expectations (Lewis 2007; Mondal 2008). 
Before focussing upon contemporary articulations of faith, it is important to acknowledge that 
the sometimes implicit Islam of earlier generations of British Pakistani Muslims was not just a 
private matter. Then, as now, their faith found public expression, for example, in the construction 
and attendance of mosques, and the production, sale, and consumption of halal food.2 First- and 
second-generation British Pakistanis did not conceal their faith; ‘they automatically assumed that 
[their country of origin] implied that they were Muslims’ (Modood et al. 1997; Afshar et al. 
2006: 172). 
Rather than a narrowly religious turn, the shift from Pakistani to Islamic identification has been a 
vehicle for some members of overlapping ethnic, racial, and religious communities, particularly 
younger women, to reject certain practices and relations and embrace others. Afshar et al. (2006: 
171) generalise that ‘nationality is a poor identifier for women’ and that ‘the historical 
construction of nationhood and nationalism is masculine in terms of its character and demands’. 
It is ‘not surprising’, they conclude, that while ‘the primary identification of many older-
generation British Pakistanis is with country … rather than religion’ (ibid.: 171), this is rejected 
by ‘second-generation migrant women’ (ibid.: 172). This is not to say that increasingly 
religiosity is simply a strategic move, motivated by the desire of young women to gain greater 
control over their lives, though there may be some element of that. In any case, the shift towards 
greater religious identification reflects changes in self-presentation, with shifting emphases 
rather than necessarily fundamental shifts in subjectivity. 
These observations about the shifts in emphasis from national to religious identification are 
borne out in some of our own research, which includes interviews with young women of 
Pakistani heritage.3 Some of these young women distanced themselves from Pakistan and from 
Pakistani identities, identifying instead with Islam and as Muslims. Saamiya, who is 18 and lives 
in Glasgow, explained that she identified primarily as a British Muslim. This, she explained, is 
‘like not being the same as like a Pakistani Muslim where the girls would kind of stay home and 
do as they are told’. Pnina Werbner explains the particular attraction of Islam for these young 
women: 
The girls argue that Islam accords equality to men and women, that it requires young people’s 
consent to a marriage and allows them to choose their own partner, and even to associate with 
their fiancés before marriage. Islam also opens up a much wider marriage market for young 
people. 
(Werbner 2007:161) 
Saamiya, like some others we spoke to as part of this research, acknowledged that Muslims 
sometimes fall short of ideals such as these, in how they live their lives, and in the ways in which 
their families, communities, and nations put their religion into practice. Their shift from 
Pakistani to Islamic (or British Islamic) identities was not a shift from national to religious 
identity, but from one way of being religious to another, where the latter is conceived as deeper 
and more committed, and also more assertive and liberated. Moving away from Pakistani 
identification, another young woman explained to us that she was able to reject some cultural 
practices that are identified as Pakistani, doing so in favour of others, which may be presented as 
Islamic and therefore harder for relatives to criticize. Laila, who is 30 and single, distanced 
herself from Pakistan, explaining that those born in Pakistan are told ‘this is how you get 
married’; they ‘weren’t allowed to go out dating’. Laila identified instead as British Asian; others 
present primarily as Muslims; in each case, they find scope to be more assertive about how they 
approach relationships and marriage, and other aspects of their lives. 
These findings resonate with those of other researchers, who have found that increased religious 
identification can be empowering for women, particularly in relation to their ability to determine 
and perhaps to reject relationships and marriages. Afshar illustrates this point in relation to 
‘mohajabehs’: women who have adopted strong forms of Islam. She argues that: 
The assertive positions and ideas of the mohajabehs have, in practice, made them undesirable 
brides for the kinship network. They know too much about their rights and have too little 
respect for the ‘traditions’. Often these women are more learned in terms of Koranic teaching 
than their parents. It has become difficult to marry them off in arranged marriages and even 
more difficult to argue with them, since their arguments are always presented in terms of ‘the 
true Islam’. An interviewee for the Muslim diaspora research, an art student who wears hijab, 
told Franks, ‘The more Islamic I become, the less likely it is that I will be pushed into an 
unwanted marriage’. This is because her parents are unable to criticize her if she is following 
Koranic teaching. Young women often use their textual understanding of Islam to contest the 
traditions and restrictions imposed on them by their parents…. 
(Afshar et al. 2006: 181; drawing upon Samad 1998; Jacobsen 1988; Shaw 1988: 435) 
Here, Afshar (2006: 181) argues, ‘faith supersedes nationality’, but nationality persists, along 
with regional and kinship identity and allegiance. ‘Muslim women who talked to’ Haleh Afshar 
‘generally accepted cultural, ethnic and national identities that defined them in different ways in 
different circumstances’ (Afshar et al. 2006: 176; drawing upon Afshar 1989; Vertovec 1998). In 
this context, faith is never reduced to a singular identity, and it is always more than abstract 
religiosity; for some, it is a form of self-assertion and empowerment. This assertiveness and self-
possession comes across in many of the interviews we conducted with young British Pakistani 
Muslims. Ifrah, who has transitioned from wearing the hijab to the abaya, stresses the importance 
of her faith, and the fact that she has not simply gone along with peers or family, but has actively 
chosen how to express it in her clothing. She told us: ‘I am actually like properly into the religion 
rather than, I am just wearing the scarf because everyone else wears it, because my parents told 
me to wear it’ (Ifrah, 21, Female). 
Crucially, though they relate primarily to personal relationships, and ultimately to marriage and 
family, these expressions of religious identity are not simply private, as would be the case in an 
entirely secular context; they also reach into areas of public life. To the feminist mantra that ‘the 
personal is political’, we must add another: ‘the religious is public’. Indeed, many of those whom 
we interviewed as part of this project stressed that their religion could not be compartmentalized; 
it informs and is expressed in all areas of their lives. As one 29-year-old woman put it, ‘I’m 
Muslim and that kind of influences my morals and my decisions and the way I interact with 
people’ (Janan). A similar point was made, more specifically and concretely, by Noor, a 27-year-
old woman, who also lives in Yorkshire. She contested the commonplace assumption that to be 
modern or liberal—to participate in mainstream culture and politics—one must leave religion at 
the door, particularly if one is a Muslim: 
I view myself as someone liberal, but that is in my cultural attitudes. It might be that you 
shouldn’t enforce things on other people, but as a Muslim I would view myself as quite kind 
of, I wouldn’t say strict because it is another word I don’t like, but I don’t think that there is 
anything that I am not doing that kind of makes me…liberal or modern, but at the same time 
I don’t think I am necessarily backwards. So I just think the need or the suggestion people to 
clarify what camp they are born into, is more damaging than useful. 
Noor refused to separate her liberal convictions and Islamic faith, and as a result she brought a 
new dimension to the former, challenging widespread assumption that liberalism and Islam are 
incompatible, and at odds with each other (Massad 2015; Phillips 2016). 
The tendency for women with similar backgrounds to identify in different ways—as British 
Asians, Asians, British Muslims, Muslims, and so on—underlines the complexity of histories of 
difference, and warns against a periodization that might suggest one form of identification has 
been supplanted by another, or even the more modest claim that one has assumed greater 
significance over time. In other words, this cautions against understanding the postsecular as 
after secularism—the period in which religion has resurfaced and been restored to prominence—
and argues instead for an understanding of the postsecular as religious expression that is 
important not only in its own right, but also as a politics, not just after but actively against 
something: in this case, against the constraints of nationalism and national identification, and for 
the rights and freedoms that may come with the reduction of such constraints. 
Conclusion 
Contesting a simply linear, chronologically historical conception of postsecularism, in which this 
term is understood as after secularism, we have advanced an understanding of the postsecular as 
against secularism. 
This distinction has counterparts in postcolonial theory, where the postcolonial has variously 
been understood as after and against colonialism. As in postcolonial criticism, this understanding 
of the post as more than chronology is important because it politicizes the term it qualifies, in 
this case postsecularism, and it recognizes the agency of those who identify with and mobilize it 
and, with it, their identification as religious. It also recognizes that some groups have been 
entirely excluded from the concept of the postsecular (see Habermas 2008) or included on the 
condition that they translate themselves into a liberal public sphere (see Cloke 2012). This is 
particularly relevant for Muslim minorities, who have been constructed as ‘external to the 
essence of Europe’ (Asad 2003: 165). While the Habermasian (2006) concept of postsecularism 
offers a place for religion in the public sphere, where its role was previously limited, the 
motivation still is to enrich the secular society with ‘key resources for the creation of meaning 
and identity’ (Habermas 2006: 10). 
For the Muslim minorities in two national contexts, post-Communist Poland and post-colonial 
Britain, leaving some parts of one’s faith in the private sphere was not possible because, as our 
interviewees stressed, ‘Islam is concerned with every aspect of life and you don’t divide the 
sacred and profane’ (Dagmara). ‘It relates to all things in society, what to do, what to eat, what to 
wear and so on, every sphere of life. Relations within your family, relations with your neighbour’ 
(Oliwia). Similarly, in the British case study, religion impacted on the ways people behaved in 
the private and the public sphere. One interviewee said: ‘I’m Muslim and that kind of influences 
my morals and my decisions and the way I interact with people’ (Maryam). Another emphasized 
how the abaya she chooses to wear outside her house represents her beliefs in public (Ifrah). 
The distinction between after and against secularism, which we have stressed, is not simply a 
matter of definition. When the postsecular is conceived as against secularism, it assumes a more 
active—one might even say implicitly political—dimension. Here, religious minorities refuse to 
apologize for themselves, refuse to be self-effacing, and demand to be recognized. Through their 
overt religiosity, they also bring new dimensions to public life. 
Notes 
1The PhD, funded by the European Research Council as part of the LiveDifference Research Programme led by Gill Valentine at 
the University of Sheffield, focused on spaces of conflict in the Polish public sphere. Fieldwork was conducted by Kasia 
Narkowicz in Warsaw between 2011 and 2012. 
2This project was led by Richard Phillips, with the involvement of Nafhesa Ali, Claire Chambers, Kasia Narkowicz, Raksha 
Pande, and Peter Hopkins. Interviews were conducted in 2016–2017. Interviewees discussed their relationship choices with 
reference to their Pakistani heritage and Islamic faith. Doing so, they revealed dynamics between ethnicity and religion, which 
inform this discussion of postsecularism. 
Further reading 
Górak-Sosnowska, K. (2011) Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe: widening the European 
discourse on Islam, Warsaw: University of Warsaw. 
This edited book provides a range of perspectives on Muslims and Islam in Poland and other 
Eastern European contexts, historically and today. 
Lewis, P. (2007) Young, British and Muslim, London: Continuum. 
This book tracks the rise—we would say the resurgence—of identification with Islam among 
young people in Britain. It shows how this form of identification was empowering for those 
involved. 
Mondal, A. (2008) Young British Muslim Voices, Oxford: Greenwood. 
Similarly, this book demonstrates identification of young people in Britain with Islam, with an 
emphasis on questions about Britishness and the place of Muslims in British society. 
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